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Abstract
We propose a new theory of choice between lotteries, which com-
bines an ‘economic’ view of decision making - based on a rational,
though incomplete, ordering - with a ‘psychological’ view - based on
heuristics. This theory can explain observed violations of EU theory,
namely all cyclical patterns of choice as well as violations of indepen-
dence.
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11 Introduction
In the face of the descriptive inadequacy of the Expected Utility (EU) model
of decision under risk, many alternative theories have been proposed1.M o s t
of these alternative theories address the violations of the Independence ax-
iom, which were ﬁrst highlighted by Allais [1] in his famous paradox. How-
ever far fewer are able to deal with the problem of intransitivity, which has
also been extensively documented, starting with Tversky [24]. This type
of violation is more fundamental, in that it seems to undermine not simply
as p e c i ﬁc theory of choice under risk, but the very principle of rationality
(usually intended as maximisation of a transitive ordering). It is fair to say
that there has been a tendency to sweep this problem under the carpet, and
there are very few formal theories that can accommodate both types of vi-
olations outlined above. They are due to Bell [3], Fishburn [8] and Loomes
and Sugden [15]. They are based on the psychological phenomenon of regret
and can explain speciﬁc types of cycles in pairwise choices between three
gambles.
In a diﬀerent tradition, psychologists have tended to emphasize the role
of heuristics and rules of thumb in human decision-making, at the expense
of general formal properties, or axioms, which are rooted in economic theory.
In this paper we propose a theory that in a sense reconciles these two
traditions, and which turns around the idea of incompleteness of rational
preferences. We contend that of the usual rationality properties of pref-
erences, it is that of completeness which is the critical one to explain the
phenomena mentioned above. This may be surprising since completeness
has been the least critically examined rationality property for preferences
over gambles, at least until recently2.
Our starting point is the recognition that choosing among lotteries is
an unfamiliar and cognitively complex task. Moreover, some choices are
intrinsically harder than others. For example, comparing two gambles one
of which dominates the other is clearly simpler than comparing two gam-
1See e.g. Starmer [23] for a recent survey.
2See e.g. Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok[7], Manzini and Mariotti[17]. The pioneering
contributions are by Aumann [2] and Bewley [4].
2bles where such a relation of dominance does not exist. In general people
are sometimes able to evaluate the trade-oﬀ between the probability and
outcome dimensions, whereas sometimes they will ﬁnd this operation just
too diﬃcult, and will rely on some secondary decision heuristics, or ‘rule of
thumb’. While economists in general have focused on the fact that people
decide on the basis of some preference ordering, psychologists have tended to
emphasise the procedural aspects of decision making, that is, the heuristics
that people use. We suggest that a descriptively satisfactory theory should
recognise that although people may not act on the basis of a complete ratio-
nal preference ordering over gambles, still they possess a partial preference
ordering (e.g. among gambles in a dominance relation). This partial pref-
erence ordering as distinct from a simple rule of thumb, should respect the
usual axioms of rationality for preferences over lotteries.
In a general way, our approach is in line with Sen’s [19] observation that:
“A chooser, who may have to balance conﬂicting considerations to arrive
at a reﬂected judgement, may not, in many cases, be able to converge on a
complete ordering when the point of decision comes. If there is no escape
from choosing, a choice decision will have to be made even with incomplete-
ness in ranking” (p. 746).
The ‘reﬂected judgement’ in this quotation is what we summarize in the
‘rational’ partial preference ordering. However, because a choice must be
made, the cognitive ‘holes’ where the preference ordering fails must be dealt
with in a way that transcends reﬂected judgement. It is here that we think
that the heuristics that psychologists have emphasised may play a role.
Of course it would be easy to explain cycles by directly postulating a
heuristic that fails to satisfy even transitivity, but this is not our approach.
The potentially cyclical preferences we are able to explain are based on
the combination of two transitive criteria, the partial preference ordering
and the rule of thumb. One notable consequence of our theory is that it
belies the standard economist view that cyclical preferences are diametrically
opposed to the idea of rationality: we will show that, in a very precise
sense, in order to explain intransitivities the individual will need to combine
both rational judgements and heuristics. An individual guided solely by
rational judgements or solely by heuristics will not reveal cyclical patterns
3of preferences.
Our theory is simple and parsimonious, and we delimit it in a clear way
by focussing our attention on elementary monetary gambles3.W ep r o p o s e
that the ‘rational’ part of the individual’s judgements is modeled just as
in EU theory. The incompleteness of rational preferences is modeled by
means of a ‘vagueness’ function, which expresses the cognitive diﬃculty the
individual faces in applying rationality. This (incomplete) version of EU
theory is combined with a well-known lexicographic heuristics for multi-
attribute decision making (studied for example by Slovic [21]).
This heuristics is a simple lexicographic (transitive) criterion4:t h ei n -
dividual will either ﬁrst scan the probability dimension and if this is not
conclusive the outcome dimension; or he will ﬁrst privilege the outcome di-
mension and then follow with the probability dimension. We show that in
this way violations of EU theory - such as Allais-type phenomena and cycles
- can be reconciled even with a theory that is extremely close to it - our
σEU model.
Although in principle our approach can be easily extended to non elemen-
tary gambles, we prefer to narrow our applications to this domain because
we believe that additional cognitive issues might aﬀect choices over non ele-
mentary gambles. In the domain of elementary gambles there is a clear cut
trade-oﬀ to be made between probabilities and outcomes; there is limited
possibility for framing eﬀects to have a bite; and there is no issue of what the
attributes are. With general gambles the situation is not so clear cut, and
there is likely to be more discussion about the proper heuristics to be used.
However, we emphasize that there is no intrinsic impossibility in principle
to extend our theory to general gambles. We are just not expert enough in
psychology to be ready to do so.
To the best of our knowledge our approach is new5, though it is con-
3By elementary monetary gambles we intend lotteries that attach a given probability to
an amount of money in a given set, and the complementary probability to getting nothing.
4The use of heuristics which treat alternatives as sets of characteristics, and lexico-
graphically consider those characteristics, is well documented in the psychological litera-
ture (from e.g. Tversky [25] to the ‘Take the Best and Leave the Rest’ heuristic introduced
in Gigerenzer and Goldstein [9]).
5In Manzini and Mariotti [16] we have proposed to use an analogous approach to the
4ceptually related to Rubinstein [18], who pioneered a theory of choice over
elementary gambles based on similarity relations. A similarity is formally
analogous to our notion of vagueness. However, the main departure from
Rubinstein is that in our theory the crucial feature is vagueness between gam-
bles rather than in each dimension (probability and outcome). The combi-
nation of this characteristic with the secondary heuristics is able to generate
intransitivities, whereas Rubinstein’s theory implies transitive choices.
2 σEU and its applications
Let X be a set of monetary consequences, and for simplicity identify X with
a closed real interval with 0 as its lower extreme. We consider individual
preferences on the set G of elementary monetary gambles on X.T h e s ea r e
the lotteries of the type (x,p;0,1 − p) to mean that the monetary prize x ∈
X i sw o nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yp, and zero with the complementary probability








Figure 1: Restriction to elementary gambles
study of the theory of choice over time. The axiomatics of that paper is, however, entirely
separate from the theory developed in the present paper.
5The individual decides in the ﬁrst instance on the basis of a primary
criterion Â which partially orders G.T h e r e f o r eg1 Â g2 means that gamble
g1 is rationally preferred to gamble g2. When g1 and g2 c a n n o tb er a t i o -
nally compared, we say that individual is ‘vague’, and we write g1 ∼ g2. In
order to ‘break’ vagueness and formulate a choice, the individual will have
to resort to a secondary criterion. Following a considerable body of work
in psychology literature (see e.g. Slovic [21], Tversky, Sattath and Slovic
[26] and Shaﬁr, Simonson and Tversky [20]) we contend that when faced
with multi attribute alternatives, decision makers focus lexicographically on
each individual attribute. In the case of elementary gambles the relevant
attributes or dimensions are clear (and as explained this is our reason for
focussing on them): they are probability and outcome. So, when vague, the
individual will either choose the alternative which oﬀers the higher outcome
or the one which oﬀers the higher probability of a positive outcome.
Individual choice is ﬁnally determined by a (complete) ordering <∗ con-
structed by combining the primary and secondary criteria.
Under standard conditions the partial order Â which describes the pri-
mary criterion can be represented by a utility function u : G → R and by a
symmetric ‘vagueness’ function σ : G × G → R,s ot h a tg1 Â g2 if and only
u(g1) >u(g2)+σ (g1,g 2).
Now we proceed to explain how <∗ can be constructed in two diﬀerent
ways, according to which attribute has prominence.
Let gi =( xi,p i) ∈ G. Then:
Outcome Prominence:
1. a Â∗ g2 ⇔
(a) u(g1) >u(g2)+σ(g1,g 2) (primary criterion), or
(b) u(gi) ≤ u(gj)+σ (gi,g j) (i =1 ,2) and either x1 >x 2 or x1 = x2
and p1 >p 2 (secondary criterion)
2. g1 ∼∗ g2 ⇔ u(gi) ≤ u(gj)+σ(gi,g j) (i =1 ,2)a n dx1 = x2 and
p1 = p2.
Probability Prominence:
61. g1 Â∗ g2 ⇔
(a) u(g1) >u(g2)+σ(g1,g 2) (primary criterion), or
(b) u(gi) ≤ u(gj)+σ (gi,g j) (i =1 ,2)a n de i t h e rp1 >p 2 or p1 = p2
and x1 >x 2 (secondary criterion)
2. g1 ∼∗ g2 ⇔ u(gi) ≤ u(gj)+σ(gi,g j) (i =1 ,2)a n dx1 = x2 and
p1 = p2.
Notice that although both the primary partial order Â and the lexico-
graphic procedure assumed above are transitive, this does not imply that
the whole procedure (i.e. the combination <∗ of the primary and secondary
criteria) is also transitive, independently of which secondary criterion ap-
plies.
In what follows we concentrate on a model which is - so to say - the
smallest possible departure from standard EU theory, and still is able to
account for a number of profound violations of that theory.
First, we assume the linearity of u in probability and therefore we impose
on u the expected utility property, that is u(x,p)=pu(x)+( 1− p)u(0)
for all x ∈ X, p ∈ [0,1], where with abuse of notation we denote u(x) as
the utility of the degenerate gamble (x,1). We further assume that u is
concave and normalise u(0) to zero. Finally we let σ (gi,g j)=σ for all
(gi,g j) ∈ G. This last simpliﬁcation makes vagueness independent of the
speciﬁc gambles being compared. However, note that relative vagueness
does depend on them, and in particular - ceteris paribus - it increases as the
probabilities of the positive prize decrease.
In this simple version of our model, which we will refer to as σEU,t h e
decision maker chooses g1 =( x,p) over g2 =( y,q) by the primary criterion
i fa n do n l yi fpu(x) >q u(y)+σ.
It is worth noting that σEU satisﬁes the following form of independence:
g1 ∼ g2 ⇒ αg1 ∼ αg2 for all α ∈ [0,1]
where αgi,w i t hgi =( xi,p i), denotes the elementary gamble (xi,αpi).I n
7fact:
g1 ∼ g2 ⇔ piu(xi) ≤ pju(xj)+σ, i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j ⇔
αpiu(xi) ≤ αpju(xj)+ασ ⇒ αpiu(xi) ≤ αpju(xj)+σ ⇔ αg1 ∼ αg2
However, it is not necessarily true that g1 Â g2 ⇒ αg1 Â αg2,a si ti se a s i l y
veriﬁed. Only the implication g1 Â g2 ⇒ αg1 < αg2 holds.
2.1 Ratio eﬀect
Kahneman and Tversky [10] highlighted a common violation of the inde-
pendence axiom using elementary gambles in a series of experiments, based
on the original Allais [1] paper. These examples exhibit the so called ‘prob-
ability ratio’ eﬀect, which is a simpler demonstration of the violation of
the independence axiom discovered by Allais. Two pairwise comparisons of
gambles are made. Denoting the ﬁrst pair of gambles to be compared (x,p)
and (y,q), the second pair has the form (x,αp) and (y,αq) where 0 < α < 1.
The independence axiom implies that (x,p) is preferred to (y,q) if and only
if (x,αp) is preferred to (y,αq). However, Kahneman and Tversky showed
that for some choices of outcomes and probabilities this predicted pattern of
choice was contradicted in actual fact. This phenomenon has been replicated
in several subsequent studies (refer to Starmer [23]). We will show that the
σEU model, despite constituting a minimal departure from the standard
EU model, can easily account for the ‘paradoxical’ choice patterns.
To see this, consider the gambles6 g1 = (4000,0.8), g2 = (3000,1), g3 =
(4000,0.2) and g4 = (3000,0.25).N o t e t h a t g3 and g4 are the same as g1
and g2, respectively, with the probability of the positive prize reduced by
af a c t o rα =0 .25. In experiments it is normally found that a signiﬁcant
majority of choosers picks g2 over g1 and g3 over g4, violating independence
and EU. These choices, however, are consistent with σEU. In fact, for this
pattern of choice it is simply required that
u(3000) > (0.8)u(4000) + σ
(0.25)u(3000) ≤ (0.2)u(4000) + σ
(0.2)u(4000) ≤ (0.25)u(3000) + σ
6Taken from Kahneman and Tversky [10].
8The ﬁr s tl i n ee n s u r e st h a tg2 is chosen over g1 by the primary criterion.
The last two inequalities assert that the comparison between g3 and g4 is
‘vague’. Then, based on the secondary criterion of Outcome Prominence,
the individual selects g3. The inequalities are compatible because there
exists a positive constant σ and a concave u such that σ <u (3000) −
(0.8)u(4000) and σ ≥ |(0.2)u(4000) − (0.25)u(3000)|. For instance, take
u(x)=l n( x +1 )and σ ∈ [0.343,1.371). In this calibration the value of σ
is realistically small compared to the size of the prizes, as the impact of a
σ close to the lower end of its admissible range is equivalent to a monetary
prize of about 0.4 (in the sense that a change by that amount in the prize
impacts on utility as much as σ does).
Whether Outcome Prominence or Probability Prominence occurs is just
a feature of the preferences of the decision maker, much as the degree of risk
aversion is. The observed pattern of choice in the class of gambles outlined
above seems to imply, if our explanation is correct, that for those gambles
Outcome Prominence is what drives choice, rather than Probability Promi-
nence. Is this reasonable? We think it is. There is experimental evidence
that in risky choices where either the outcome is aﬀectively signiﬁcant (as a
large monetary win certainly is) and/or probabilities are low, the probability
component of the gamble tends to be neglected.7 Sometimes this tendency
even generates violations of the more fundamental principle of dominance.
For example in an experiment by Denes-Raj and Epstein [6] people were
asked to choose which of two urns was to be used to determine whether or
not they win a monetary prize. A sizable number of subjects chose an urn
with a smaller proportion of winning chips (jelly beans) favouring the higher
absolute number of winning chips (e.g. 7 in 100) of this urn over the higher
probability of winning of the other urn (e.g. 1 winning chip in 10)!
Arguably, what constitutes a ‘low’ probability varies across individuals
and is a fundamental component of their own preferences. At any rate, one
would expect a stronger probability ratio eﬀect the smaller α is. Indeed,
Kahneman and Tversky [10] ﬁnd precisely this eﬀect with gambles g1 =
(6000,0.45), g2 = (3000,0.90), g3 = (6000,0.001) and g4 = (3000,0.0.002).
7See for example Kunreuther, Novemsky and Kahneman [11] as well as Slovic [22] and
the bibliography therein.
9In this case, most people would regard the probabilities of winning in gam-
bles g3 and g4 as negligible, and we would feel conﬁdent that Outcome
Prominence occurs. Kahneman and Tversky [10] themselves observe that,
for gambles g1 and g2 “the probabilities of winning are substantial”, whereas
for the other gambles there is “a possibility of winning, although the prob-
abilities of winning are minuscule... In this situation, where winning is
possible but not probable, most people choose the prospect that oﬀers the
larger gain” (p. 267, italics in the original).
2.2 Cycles
A second class of experimental violations of the EU model concerns intran-
sitivities which generate cyclical patterns of choice. We want to show that
the combination of the two transitive criteria in our σEU model can account
for this apparent irrationality.
To illustrate this point we use elementary gambles of the type employed
for example in Loomes, Starmer and Sugden [14]. Let g1 =( x,p), g2 =( y,q)
and g3 =( z,r),w h e r ex>y>zand p<q<r≤ 1. One possible
cycle which has been observed experimentally is generated when in pairwise
choices g1 is chosen over g2, g2 is chosen over g3 and g3 is chosen over g1.T h i s
is consistent with σEU generated preferences under Outcome Prominence -




The ﬁrst inequality establishes that g3 is chosen over g1 by the primary
criterion. The second inequality instead provides conditions for g1 to be
chosen over g2. To see this, observe that there are two cases. Either (i)
pu(x) >q u(y)+σ,o r(ii) the comparison between g1 and g2 is vague. In
case (i) g1 is chosen by the primary criterion. In case (ii) g1 ‘wins’ by the
secondary criterion. Similarly, the last inequality in the display provides
conditions for g2 to be chosen over g3.
The other observed cycle is generated when g1 is chosen over g3, g3
is chosen over g2 and g2 is chosen over g1. T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hσEU




The ﬁrst inequality establishes that g1 is chosen over g3 by the primary
criterion. The second (resp. third) inequality instead provides conditions
for g2 (resp. g3)t ob ec h o s e no v e rg1 (resp. g2) by either the primary
criterion or the secondary criterion.
As we emphasised above, being in a state of vagueness and favouring
either OP or PP is a structural feature of individual preferences. However,
keeping the prizes ﬁxed, on average we would expect the OP criterion to
be relied upon more in correspondence with lower probabilities. Indeed, the
data in Loomes, Starmer and Sugden [14] appear to support this conclusion.
For example, when the gambles where (16,0.4), (9,0.6) and (4,1),t h e r e
were 2 OP cycles against 15 PP cycles (out of 100 choices made by diﬀerent
subjects). However once the probabilities of the uncertain outcomes where
reduced to generate the gambles (16,0.2), (9,0.3) and (4,0.5) the number
of OP cycles shot up to 9 against a reduction of the PP cycles to 13. In
the four comparisons of this type which can be made based on their data a
reduction in probabilities keeping prizes constant never reduces the number
of OP cycles and in three cases it increases them. Also, in three cases the
number of PP cycles is reduced.
The PP cycle (and therefore regret theory) explains one other major
‘anomaly’ ﬁrst noted by Lichtenstein and Slovic [12] and Lindman [13],
termed preference reversal. They noticed that while some people preferred a
lottery with higher prize obtained with lower probability ($-bet), they were
prepared to pay less for it than for the competing lower prize-higher prob-
ability elementary gamble (P-bet). These preferences can be interpreted as
aP Pc y c l ew i t hg1 representing $-bet, g2 representing the P-bet and where
g3 =( z,1) is a sure bet.
The preference reversal phenomenon was detected by engaging experi-
mental subjects in both a ‘choice task’ (i.e. selecting either the $-bet or the
11P-bet) and a ‘matching task’ (i.e. ‘match’ a price to a gamble), where the
certainty equivalent of both the $-bet and the P-bet is elicited. In a recent
paper Cubitt, Munro and Starmer [5] carry out tests for preference reversal
where the choice task can be paired with either the standard matching task,
thereby providing a monetary valuation of each gamble; or a non standard
matching task (probability valuation) where what is elicited is the probabil-
ity p that makes the individual indiﬀerent between either the $-bet or the
P-bet, and another gamble where some monetary amount X (determined by
the experimenter) is obtained with the elicited probability p.T h e yﬁnd that
the pairing of the choice task and the monetary valuation task generates a
much higher frequency of PP cycles8. However with pairings of the choice
task and the probability valuation task, the frequency of OP cycles increases
considerably, and for some set of parameters exceeds that of PP cycles. They
discuss possible explanations for the experimental results, and highlight how
traditional economic theory9, which require agents’ choice to be free from
framing eﬀects, cannot be reconciled with the experimental evidence10.O n
the other hand our σEU model might help explain the evidence.
An interesting aspect of our theory is that it is compatible with both
types of possible cycles, oﬀering a psychological support for each of them. In
our framework we do not postulate which secondary criterion a subject might
employ, and we cannot rule out the possibility that the same individual
might employ a diﬀerent secondary criterion depending on the context.F o r
instance, once the probability dimension is highlighted (as in the probability
valuation) it is not unreasonable to expect that the probability dimension
becomes the most prominent, thus favouring PP cycles.
A second remarkable aspect is that cycles can only occur when vagueness
is not too great. When for example σis so large as to prevent any application
of expected utility, no cycle can occur. Similarly, when σ is so small as to
prevent any application of the heuristics, equally no cycle can occur. In
8Our PP cycles correspond to the ‘standard reversals’ in Cubitt, Munro and Starmer
[5], that is the P-bet is chosen over $-bet, but the latter has higher monetary value. On
the other hand our OP cycles correspond to their ‘counter reversals’, where the $-bet is
chosen over P-bet, which now has higher monetary value.
9Including regret theory. See Loomes, Starmer and Sugden [14].
10See also Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman [27].
12order to produce cycles one needs intermediate levels of vagueness.
3 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that some ‘EU paradoxes’ of decision making
under risk, including cyclical choices, can be explained by the way decision
makers tackle cognitive diﬃculties in assessing probabilistic outcomes. Our
core argument is that the decision maker is able to make at least some ratio-
nal, reﬂected judgements. Such judgements are embodied in a partial order-
ing which satisﬁes usual rationality properties. The situation of ‘vagueness’,
where such judgement fails, automatically calls for heuristics that enable the
decision maker to express a preference in order to arrive at making a choice.
We have thus combined an economic view of decision making - focused on
rationality - and a psychological view - based on heuristics.
The strength of our σEU model, which is extremely close to the EU
model, is that it can explain not only ‘Allais type’ violations of indepen-
dence, but also cyclical choice patterns, regardless of whether or not they
are consistent with alternative theories (e.g. regret theory). Indeed, al-
though the heuristic we postulate in the σEU model is not itself cyclical,
the whole choice procedure may fail to be transitive.
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